



COMPLEXITY WITHOUT CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE

Author(s): Geoff Bennington

Source: *AA Files*, No. 15 (Summer 1987), pp. 15-18

Published by: [Architectural Association School of Architecture](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29543585>

Accessed: 13-02-2016 09:33 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Architectural Association School of Architecture is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *AA Files*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

COMPLEXITY WITHOUT CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE

Geoff Bennington

Recent discussion of post-modernism seems beset by confusions of all sorts. The discussion has become confused because the commentators have insisted on asking whether or not post-modernism is an 'event', rather than, say, 'media hype', and on asking this question with an uncritical notion of the 'event'. Jencks, Jameson and Eagleton, for example, are all keen to absorb events into continuities, genealogies and teleologies (Jameson's assumption that genealogy escapes the problems of teleological history is never argued or put to the test). There is really little to choose between them in this respect.¹ If they are able to think of an 'event', this must be thought of as a break and a new start. Such a view is irremediably 'modern' in inspiration,² and cannot begin to understand the temporal complexity which authors such as Lyotard and Derrida address. It may well be that the very term 'post-modern' invites such a view to the point of self-destruction, but it seems clear that attempts to periodize and classify so as to judge and expel or extol can only take place on the basis of a repression of the question of the event which Lyotard is attempting to work with. Derrida too suggests in his discussion of Tschumi's La Villette scheme that terms in post- are used by a compulsive historicism, 'as if yet again one wished to put order into a linear succession, to periodise, distinguish between the before and the after, limit the risks of reversibility or repetition, of transformation or permutation: progressist ideology'.³ Derrida's appeal to the word 'maintenant' is an attempt to escape this type of temporal organization, and the tension of that 'maintenant' is directly comparable to what Lyotard in *Le Différend* means by 'the event'.⁴ In this article I shall not so much attempt an exposition of 'the event' in recent French thought, as begin a tentative and preliminary elaboration of this question of the event as it relates to the work of Venturi, Eisenman and Tschumi.

I take my cue, in the first instance, from Venturi's *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*,⁵ and specifically from Chapter 9 of that book, 'The Inside and the Outside', where the question of the event appears explicit. Arguing against the 'flowing space' of modernism and the tendency to impose a continuity between inside and outside, Venturi writes that 'Since the inside is different from the outside, the wall — the point of change — becomes an architectural event' (p. 86). And, in so far as most architecture is concerned to build walls separating inside from outside, it would appear that architecture is all about events.

In arguing for a complex and contradictory architecture, Venturi draws most of his authority from literary criticism, notably the tradition stemming from Eliot — and indeed in his preface he quotes Eliot on criticism and tradition. It would not, I think, be difficult to trace the

genealogy of Venturi's notions of complexity, contradiction, the 'difficult whole' and so on through this tradition. Mannerist and baroque buildings are to Venturi what the English Metaphysical poets are to Eliot. In this literary tradition, 'complexity' is valorized in so far as it is thought in terms of ambiguity, irony, balance: the 'difficulty' of the whole may be partly an academic obscurity, and would exclude the potential populism of Venturi's 'is not Main Street almost all right?' (p. 104) and of *Learning from Las Vegas*.

To someone approaching architectural criticism from literary studies, these references in Venturi's work are surprising: the rather stuffy urbanity of Eliot's critical writing seems often to control rather than respect the disruptive energies which might be detected in literary modernism, and which would nowadays be approached through the work of Kristeva or Derrida rather than Eliot. In Derridean terms, this would lead to a wariness of the value of 'contradiction', because of its Hegelian ancestry — the determination of difference as contradiction invites the sublimation of that contradiction into a totality (however 'difficult').⁶ It would equally lead to suspicions about ambiguity: even if extended to mean 'polysemy', ambiguity remains within the ambit of a notion of meaning as ideally unitary and recoverable. Derrida has questioned these values, especially in 'La Double séance':

If, then, there is no thematic unity or total meaning to be reappropriated beyond textual instances, in an imaginary, an intentionality or a lived experience, the text is no longer the expression or representation (happy or not) of some *truth* which would come to be diffracted or gathered in a polysemic literature. It is for this hermeneutic concept of *polysemy* that should be substituted that of *dissemination*.⁷

Dissemination disrupts the totality and any search for 'meaning', and to this extent it is as uncomfortable for Venturi's book as for any other (but the constitutive vagueness of discursive terms in architectural criticism — does anybody, for example, really know what the word 'meaning' means when applied to architecture? — makes this problem both more urgent and, perhaps, more approachable). But Venturi's book invites closer reading with Derrida: *Complexity and Contradiction* (1966) has its chapter entitled 'The Inside and the Outside'; Derrida's *De la grammatologie* (1967) has a chapter with the title 'Le dehors et le dedans'. Derrida is of course analysing the notion of the sign, especially as formulated by Saussure, whereas Venturi is analysing buildings. But the (inevitable) tendency to discuss architecture in terms of meaning should allow some cautious use of analogy between these analyses; and Derrida's appeal to the initially spatial categories of

inside and outside in what must, at least at first, seem like an analogical way (for what does it mean *literally* to suggest that signs have an 'inside' and an 'outside'?) suggests that the analogy does not work in only one direction.

Care must be taken here to avoid misunderstanding: at first sight Derrida seems to be suggesting that the opposition between inside and outside cannot be sustained, and his next chapter affirms that the inside *is* the outside;⁸ Venturi, on the other hand, is attacking the continuity between inside and outside which he sees as being promoted by modernism, with its 'emphasis on the oneness of interior and exterior space', and he is stressing that 'the inside *is* different from the outside' (p. 70). But the matter is more complicated than this apparent opposition would suggest: Venturi may indeed be arguing for separation as against any 'ultimate continuity of space' (*ibid.*), but the point of this is to move against the modernist dictum that 'the inside should be *expressed* on the outside' (*ibid.*, my emphasis). And this presupposition that the outside expresses (or represents or signifies) an inside is of course also the object of Derrida's investigation. The whole classical notion of the sign, as divided into signifier and signified, rests on an inside/outside opposition, and on the presupposition that the outside somehow reveals the inside. As Derrida shows, an underlying assumption here is that the inside, the signified, exists ideally prior to and independently of the outside: the outside is the accidental ('arbitrary') means of access to the inside; it should ideally not obstruct access, should be transparent. The plate-glass 'walls' of the modernist cube appear to be analogous to such a transparency of the outside. On the other hand, in so far as there *is* an inside, it must necessarily have an outside to define it *as* an inside: the border, even if made of glass, must be at least as much a place of separation as a place of communication (this combination of separation and communication defining the notion of the limit as a place of *articulation*).⁹ Even modernist buildings must provide at least a *thermal* difference between inside and outside, as Venturi points out.

Pursuing the analogy a little further, the modernist pretension (as analysed by Venturi — 'the truth of the matter' is not at stake here) to reduce the barrier between inside and outside to the transparency of a sheet of glass would be an extension of what is diagnosed by Derrida as 'logocentrism' — taking the need to 'express' the inside on the outside to the limiting case of reducing the outside to almost nothing. Or, in terms of Derrida's analysis of writing, such architecture would correspond to the Western investment in the excellence of so-called 'phonetic' writing rather than the hieroglyph and ideogram, which, as against the democratic accessibility of phonetic script, protect the inside as a potential mystery from all but a select few. Paradoxes proliferate in this situation: phonetic writing, which apparently *reduces* the separation of inside and outside, might also be said to *confirm* it all the more forcefully. Derrida describes Saussure anxiously confirming the exteriority of writing to speech precisely by stressing the demands of the phonetic: if only writing could become the diaphanous means of access to the interior, it could not be said to penetrate or affect that interior at all.

In this situation, which is complexity itself, a number of moves might be made. We might argue, for example, that Derrida has demonstrated the impossibility of conceiving the inside prior to and independently of the outside. Only an outside can define an inside. In the analysis of the sign, this leads, in a sense, to the idea that there is no signified: a signified is no more than a signifier placed in a certain position by other signifiers. Look up any word in the dictionary to 'get at' its signified, and you find more signifiers referring to ever more signifiers — the signified is no more than an effect (not quite an illusion) of the 'play of signifiers'.¹⁰ Once this has been acknowledged, it is difficult to retain the notion of signifier (and this marks Derrida's difference from doctrines of the 'materiality of the signifier', which is in any case a

contradiction in terms):¹¹ 'signifier' can only imply 'what signifies a signified' and, if there is no signified to be signified, there is no signifier to signify it (whence Derrida's introduction of the notion of the *trace*). The inside 'is' the outside, but this rapidly leads to the conclusion that there is no outside either, but a generalized differential space organized into 'effects' (not quite illusions) of inside and outside. A radical 'flowing space' would not simply reduce the wall to a sheet of glass, but would show that the inside is merely a fold or invagination in a generalized 'outside'. The plate-glass window maintains separation all the more securely for suggesting its abolition — it might promise continuity, yet break your nose if you try to take up that promise, whereas nobody would walk into an honest wall.

Venturi, also suspicious of the expression of inside on the outside, fights against the 'Saussurean' solution of reducing the outside, the better to keep it outside (in my loose analogy, the 'transparent' walls of the modern office-block keep the outside out all the more securely by displaying the inside as powerful and mysterious). Venturi suggests that, if the possibility of reducing the separation of inside and outside is an illusion, then better to accept that separation and make something of it. He likes the difference to be great and mysterious, and it is no accident that temples at Karnak and Edfu appear as illustrations at this point, or that he should refer to the 'partial mystery inherent in a sense of privacy' (p. 71) in this chapter.

It would be nice, but I think an over-simplification, to conclude that Venturi, faced with the failure of a certain modernism's apparent denial of the inside/outside opposition, takes fright and insists, regressively, on their separation, whereas Derrida demands, progressively, that the opposition be deconstructed altogether. I would not deny the presence of 'regressive' moments in Venturi's text and 'progressive' ones in Derrida's, supporting an argument presenting Venturi as a 'conservative' 'post-modernist' and Derrida as a radical modernist, but it is just as easy to imagine a counter-argument which presents Venturi as the progressivist, arguing for a flexible and liveable negotiation of inside and outside, and Derrida as the advocate of an apparently hermetic script. The ease with which such characterizations can be constructed suggests that there is something wrong with them.

We can complicate this picture (and note that in order to do so we must jettison any simple notion of contradiction), as far as Venturi is concerned, by noting that his rejection of continuity between inside and outside is not *simply* an affirmation of their radical separation. He uses the Egyptian temples, not so much to suggest that there might be a mystery at their centre, but as an example of a series of enclosures of enclosures. Such a configuration does not always imply a central mystery. Barthes, for example, persistently used the formally identical model of the onion as an image of the text, made up of layers within layers but containing nothing at its centre, reading becoming the *process* of negotiating the layers rather than the triumphant arrival at any 'core' of meaning.¹² Moreover, by advocating quite aggressively a different treatment of the inside and outside *surfaces* of the wall, Venturi splits the line of limit or border in a way that might easily look to Derrida rather than Eliot for its language. And, against his own location and valorization of 'contradiction' between inside and outside, Venturi also makes more subtle moves, leading to an idea of 'residual spaces' which cannot easily be accommodated within a rigid polarity of inside/outside:

Residual space in between dominant spaces *with varying degrees of openness* can occur at the scale of the city and is a characteristic of the fora and other complexes of late Roman urban planning. Residual spaces are not unknown in our cities. I am thinking of the open spaces under our highways and the buffer spaces around them. Instead of acknowledging and exploiting these characteristic kinds of space we make them into parking lots or feeble patches of grass — no-man's lands between the scale of the region and the locality. (p. 80, my emphasis)

In this description, 'residual space' is neither simply inside nor outside: rather, it seems to be a pocket of outside within the inside, the 'no-man's land' of frontier and margin at the centre of the city (in Lyotard's terms, the zone of the *pagus*, from which Lyotard derives his notion of 'the pagan').¹³ In spite of Venturi's insistence that inside is different from outside, this description of 'residual space' disrupts the very dichotomy he is trying to reinforce.¹⁴ This disruption is confirmed by Aldo van Eyck, in a quotation Venturi provides, apparently in support of his own argument:

Architecture should be conceived of as a configuration of intermediary places clearly defined. This does not imply continual transition or endless postponement with respect to place and occasion. On the contrary, it implies a break away from the contemporary concept (call it sickness) of spatial continuity and the tendency to erase every articulation between spaces, i.e. between outside and inside, between one space and another (between one reality and another). Instead the transition must be articulated by means of defined in-between places which induce simultaneous awareness of what is significant on either side. An in-between space in this sense provides the common ground where conflicting polarities can again become twin phenomena. (p.82)

Despite the manifestly dialectical character of this description, it would not be difficult to see this notion of the 'in-between' (see Derrida's play on 'entre' and 'antre' in 'La Double séance'),¹⁵ as the generalizable 'medium' of the same (not the identical, as both Heidegger and Derrida insist) in which differentiation takes place. 'In-between' space then becomes less a space than the spatiality or *spacing* of space. And, as van Eyck suggests, architecture would then consist in the 'configuring' (differentiating) of this space into spaces which are always intermediary. This reading exercises a certain amount of violence on van Eyck's text, as it leads to the idea that, in a sense, this *does* imply a 'continual transition or endless postponement' with respect to *both* place *and* occasion. We are very close to Derrida here, specifically his derivation of *différance*, differing and deferring.¹⁶ This description also takes up the *temporal* aspect of what van Eyck says, and if we are to make sense of architecture as it has to do with the event, we must talk about time as well as space. To have a closer look at these possibilities, I shall leave Venturi and move to two architects who explicitly invoke the work of Derrida, namely Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi.

Paradoxically, invocation of Derrida in texts by and around Eisenman make the discussion rather more difficult than in the case of Venturi. It may be that in some sense Eisenman is proposing a more or less rigorously 'deconstructive' architecture; this clearly does not imply that the discursive links of such an architecture with the work of Derrida are successfully negotiated. For example, in one of the essays in the *Fin d'Ou T Hou S* folio, Jeffrey Kipnis picks up on the notion of in-betweenness, and writes the following: 'The betweenness reading, which Derrida calls "*différance*", is the always in-flux space that constitutes the relations that are reading itself; scene of intrinsic subjectivity, it is the *playground* named Mind.'¹⁷ Now, whatever 'intrinsic subjectivity' means here (or 'mind', for that matter), it is an odd way to talk about Derrida. Kipnis has earlier in his text introduced the notion of reading and subjectivity which inform the sentence I have just quoted. He writes, for example, that 'writing, in Derrida's formulation, is any and every organisation of form that stimulates an organised experience of reading' (p.15), and that 'writing', in the generalized sense given to the word by Derrida, consists in 'subjectively vested . . . forms caught up endlessly in referring to other forms' (ibid.). I do not know where Kipnis has found the authority for these appeals to reading and to subjects, for there is no such appeal in Derrida. The source is more likely to be Barthes, for whom the proclaimed 'death of the author' (which would correspond closely to Eisenman's heralded absence as architect from his own programmed architecture) is all too rapidly paid for by the birth of the

reader.¹⁸ Derrida's 'writing' is in fact the death of the reader as much as the death of the author. In *Of Grammatology*, for instance, he says that writing is *other* than the subject, in whatever sense one chooses to take those words.¹⁹ And if he invokes 'experience' around the argument that writing, in the generalized sense, is (among other things) the 'formation of form', it is an 'experience' which takes transcendental phenomenology to its limits before passing through the notion of experience as derived and secondary to that of the trace. Derrida comments on the necessity of crossing through these transcendental arguments, as otherwise the 'ultra-transcendental' text (which he is proposing) could easily look like the 'pre-critical' text, which I fear is what Kipnis has provided.²⁰ (The same gross error, that Derrida's philosophy is merely a form of subjectivism, is also perpetrated in the recent interview in *Domus*.)²¹

Eisenman's own presentations are also quite obscure and uneven. In the Romeo and Juliet material,²² for example, the attempt to disrupt the value of presence by opposing it to void and by re-defining absence, is confusing: and that redefinition of absence as 'either the trace of a previous presence' (in which case it 'contains *memory*'), or else as 'the trace of a possible presence' (in which case it 'contains *immanence*'), falls short of the Derridean account of the trace on which it clearly draws. Eisenman's account is essentially that of the phenomenology traversed by Derrida in *Of Grammatology* and *Speech and Phenomena*. By thinking in terms of memory and past or future presence, Eisenman remains within a metaphysical and essentially linear conception of time, which Derrida has so patiently undermined. He is also still thinking in a fundamentally dialectical way, both in this account of absence and the temporality of the site, and in the three 'structural relationships' he takes from the story of Romeo and Juliet (the dialectic of division, and then union-and-division of the lovers in the tomb). Derrida's own discussion of *Romeo and Juliet* (there is no reason to assume that Eisenman would or should know it)²³ disrupts this simplicity with a non-dialectical complexity, in which 'division' inhabits identity in, for example, the simultaneous unity and division of Romeo and his name. It may be, of course, that Eisenman's project in some sense shows this, even if his discourse does not quite describe it. But, as the claim of Eisenman's work is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate building and discourse, this unevenness in the relationship of text and building cannot be ignored.

Whatever the value of Eisenman's descriptions, and whatever the doubts induced by his appeal to the notion of self-similarity, which could lead as much to closure as to opening, if interpreted in terms of the *mise-en-abyme* (and Eisenman's idea of the architectural object becoming 'internalized', 'self-definitive', 'true to its own logic', proposing 'an intrinsic value system' suggests that he is no stranger to that too hasty interpretation),²⁴ it is clear that his is an attempt to think time within the space of architecture, beyond the obvious sense of the time of a building's building or existence. If this is an attempt at an architecture of the event, it clearly cannot simply mean that the building of a building is an event, nor that it provides a space in which events can take place.

It is precisely this concern which Derrida finds at work in Tschumi's La Villette project (§3). I asked before if anyone really knows what it means to talk of meaning in architecture; even if no one does, the fact would remain, according to Derrida, that the meaning of architecture is that it should have meaning (Derrida presents this as the postulate underlying four invariables which traverse the history of architecture (§8).) The meaning of architecture cannot itself be architectural, and to this extent architecture is governed by principles outside itself (§9). Derrida's complex argument suggests that Tschumi's project disrupts this configuration of architecture and meaning. Clearly this is again a question of the deconstruction of an inside/outside polarity, if not quite in the sense I have sketched out apropos of Venturi. It is emphatically

not a question, in Derrida's reading of Tschumi, of simply refusing the outside, the 'extrinsic' meanings imposed on architecture, in favour of some notional internal purity or propriety of architecture, as we might still suspect to be the case with Eisenman. Just as Venturi's desire to separate inside and outside led to a complication of the structure of the limit which separates, so Tschumi's project both *includes* the outside (it does not refuse external demands of utility and so on), and opens the inside of architecture to its others (photography, cinema and so on). Tschumi's architecture would thus by definition not be *proper* architecture, and it would be unreasonable, as in the case of Eisenman, simply to separate the building from the texts, drawings and so on which accompany it.

In Derrida's reading, Tschumi maintains 'the dis-jointed as such', to 'give dissociation its due, but to put it to work *as such* in the space of a gathering' (the gathering that is the fundamental motif of Heidegger's 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking'). The logic here is precisely that which governs Derrida's thinking on inside and outside (and thereby his thought in general, in so far as separating inside and outside is the act of separation itself, the analysis, critique, conceptualizing which defines philosophy): the 'points' on Tschumi's grid gather their own separation, hold together and apart both togetherness and apartness, associate and dissociate both association and dissociation, in a *tension* which refuses the dialectical solutions proposed by Eisenman, and which could not give rise to the suspicion of closure invited by Eisenman's appeal to 'self-similarity'. (§§13–15. I would want to argue that such an 'economy of dissociation' is identical to that briefly proposed under the sign of 'dissensus' by Lyotard at the end of *The Postmodern Condition*, against Habermas — Derrida here talks of 'a *socius* of dissociation' (§14).) This tension cannot be thought in simply spatial terms, nor in terms of a temporality itself thought of as external to space (it is not simply a question of providing a space in which temporal events might occur). But the *spacing* of Tschumi's grid (which is not just its space) is an attempt to work at the root of space and time — because each of Tschumi's cubes is caught in the web of all the others, none is a self-sufficient entity. Effects of inside and outside are certainly produced here, but they are neither the simple separations recommended by Venturi, nor simply the flowing space he is attacking. Tschumi's points *interrupt* the flow as much as they allow for it, and are themselves as divisible as they are punctual. The 'maintenant' stressed by Derrida, the now and the maintaining, is a maintenance not of presence but of spacing and interruption, of what he calls 'the relation with the other as such' (§16).

The relation with the other as such ('as such' is important, marking that what is at stake here is respect for the alterity of the other, which defines some of Derrida's most 'technical' thinking,²⁵ and which marks that thinking as fundamentally ethical, is still all to do with insides and outsides, walls and events. Our 'deconstruction' of the wall in Venturi is not an attempt to deny the force or urgency of his insistence that the outside is different from the inside, but to modulate its mildly exasperated common sense into something like Tschumi's *folies*, where the difference of outside and inside is, as it were, already inside anyway. The 'promise', or invitation to the Other, located by Derrida in Tschumi's project is not simply an invitation (to 'the public') to come into the warm, nor to become a community (again). The ethico-political importance of this is made clear in a comparison of the Villette project and *Learning from Las Vegas*, where the *socius* in dissociation is apparently to be abandoned to the virtues of the strip. Dissociation, an absolute condition of the political rather than the unfortunate failure of community it is often taken to be, need not accept its traditional (even dialectical) negative marking; as the active negotiation of walls between insides and outsides rather than their intolerant institution or illusory abolition, dissociation proceeds as an aleatory series of events. What will happen at La Villette remains: to be seen.

Notes

1. For more detailed discussion, see my paper 'The Rationality of Postmodern Relativity', forthcoming in the proceedings of the Architectural Association Graduate School History and Theory Programme conference 'The Relative and the Rational in the Architecture and Culture of the Present', May 1987.
2. cf. Jean-François Lyotard, 'Note sur les sens de "post-"', in *Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants* (Paris, 1986), pp. 119–26 (120–1); earlier English version, 'Defining the Postmodern', in *Postmodernism*, ICA Documents 4 and 5 (1986), 6–7 (p. 6).
3. Jacques Derrida, 'Point de folie — maintenant l'architecture', in Bernard Tschumi, *La Case vide*, AA Folio VIII (1986), 4–19, §2, translation modified.
4. Jean-François Lyotard, *Le Différend* (Paris, 1983). I take this notion of the event as the guiding thread in my forthcoming exposition of Lyotard's thought: *Lyotard: Writing the Event* (Manchester University Press).
5. Robert Venturi, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (New York, 1977). Page references will be included in the text.
6. This implies that contradiction, despite appearances, in fact works towards homogenization, whereas a thought of difference, despite its apparent modesty, respects heterogeneity.
7. Jacques Derrida, *La Dissémination* (Paris, 1972), p. 294.
8. Jacques Derrida, *De la grammatologie* (Paris, 1967). In fact, in a notorious gesture, Derrida crosses through the copula in this chapter-title, to stress a movement of excess with respect to traditional ontology.
9. See for example *De la grammatologie*, Chapter 3, Section III. But this logic of the limit pervades all of Derrida's thinking.
10. On this sense of the word 'effect', which cannot be reduced to cause/effect any more than to truth/illusion, see especially Derrida's *Positions* (Paris, 1972), p. 90.
11. Simply because the identity of the signifier is secured despite its potentially disparate material repetitions. It is odd that Derrida has been so widely misread on this point, given the clarity of his statements: see for example *De la grammatologie*, pp. 20, 45, 138–9.
12. See, for example, Barthes's own reflection on his use of this type of image, in *Roland Barthes* (Paris, 1975), pp. 54–5.
13. See Jean-François Lyotard, *Instructions patentes* (Paris, 1977), pp. 42–3; *Au Juste* (Paris, 1979), pp. 74–5; *Le Différend*, §218.
14. This is also true of Venturi's remarks about 'open poché'.
15. *La Dissémination*, pp. 240–1.
16. See especially the essay 'La Différance' in *Marges — de la philosophie* (Paris, 1972), pp. 1–29.
17. Jeffrey Kipnis, 'Architecture Unbound: Consequences of the Recent Work of Peter Eisenman', in Peter Eisenman, *Fin d'Ou T HouS*, AA Folio V (1985), pp. 12–23 (p. 16).
18. Roland Barthes, 'La Mort de l'auteur', in *Le Bruissement de la langue* (Paris, 1984), pp. 61–7 (p. 67). The final sentence of Barthes's article makes it clear that he is proposing a *reversal* of the traditional model, which forgets the reader in favour of the author. This stress on the addressee in general has been persuasively argued by Vincent Descombes to be characteristic of structuralism, and to limit its claims to break with a 'philosophy of the subject': see *Le Même et l'autre: Quarante-cinq ans de philosophie française (1933–1978)* (Paris, 1979), especially pp. 114, 123–4.
19. 'Le constituant et le disloquant à la fois, l'écriture est autre que le sujet, en quelque sens qu'on l'entende', *De la grammatologie*, p. 100.
20. *De la grammatologie*, p. 90.
21. Interview conducted by Eva Meyer, February 1986: Jacques Derrida, 'Architecture ove il desiderio può abitare', *Domus* 681 (April 1986), pp. 17–24.
22. Peter Eisenman, *Moving Arrows, Eros and Other Errors*, AA Box 3 (1986).
23. Jacques Derrida, 'L'Aphorisme à contretemps'. This text was written as a programme-note for a French production, and will appear in English translation in a forthcoming volume of essays on Shakespeare, edited by Nick Royle.
24. Derrida, 'Point de folie . . .', §10: 'In reinstituting architecture in what should have been singularly *proper* to it, it is above all not a matter of reconstituting a *simplicity* of architecture, a simply architectural architecture, by a purist or integratist obsession. It is no longer a matter of saving the proper in the virginal immanence of its economy and of returning it to its inalienable presence, finally non-representative, non-mimetic and referring only to itself. This autonomy of architecture, which would claim in this way to reconcile a formalism and a semanticism in their extremes, would do no more than accomplish the metaphysics it was claiming to deconstruct.' Much of the Eisenman material I have seen is vulnerable to these remarks.
25. Since this text was written, Derrida has published a text on Eisenman ('Pourquoi Peter Eisenman écrit de si bons livres', in *Psyché. Invention de l'autre* (Paris, 1987), pp. 495–508) which suggests a much more generous interpretation than I offer here. I am unable here to go into the detail of this disagreement, or into the relationship between this new text and the piece on Tschumi I discuss here.

25. See for example the elucidation of the 'trace' in *De la grammatologie*, pp. 68–9.